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COMPENSATION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN
MONTANA: DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN
BYSTANDERS AND DIRECT VICTIMS
Francis X. Clinch and Jodie L. Johnson
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts have been unwilling to extend legal protection to a per-
son's interest in peace of mind.' Especially they have disfavored
liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress.2 Courts fear
that, because emotional inj6ry cannot be observed objectively, ju-
dicial remedy will lead to compensation of fraudulent claims. 3
Fearing both a flood of litigation and unlimited liability, many
courts have rejected compensation for emotional distress.4 In its
recent decisions in Versland v. Caron Transport5 and Johnson v.
Supersave Markets, the Montana Supreme Court announced two
very different standards for proving the genuineness of foreseeable
emotional distress.
This comment discusses the traditional standards of proof
which courts employed to determine the genuineness of emotional
distress and traces the development of standards allowing compen-
sation for foreseeable bystander victims of emotional distress. It
then analyzes Montana cases addressing emotional distress and
discusses the problems raised by the Versland and Johnson deci-
sions. Finally, it will urge the adoption of a uniform standard for
proving the genuineness and compensability of foreseeable emo-
tional distress.
II. TRADITIONAL METHODS FOR LIMITING LIABILITY
A. The Distinction Between the Direct Victim and Bystander
Victim
The Montana Supreme Court and other courts distinguish di-
rect victims of emotional distress from bystander victims of emo-
1. See W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 54-55 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter cited as LAW OF TORTS].
2. Id. § 54, at 359-60.
3. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 288, 47 N.E. 88, 89
(1887); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558
(1969).
4. See, e.g., Spade, 168 Mass. at 288; Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 558.
5. - Mont. 671 P.2d 583 (i983).
6. - Mont. 686 P.2d 209 (1984).
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tional distress.' Courts make the distinction in an effort to ensure
that only foreseeable emotional distress injuries be compensated.8
The Versland case illustrates the distinction and its rationale.
The plaintiff in Versland was a farm wife who suffered emo-
tional distress after seeing the defendant's semi-truck strike and
kill her husband as he was riding a bale wagon on a state highway."
There were two victims in Versland. The direct victim, to whom
the defendant directed his negligent conduct,10 was the farmer
whom the defendant struck and killed. The bystander victim was
the farmer's wife who watched her husband die and suffered emo-
tional distress even though the defendant directed none of his con-
duct toward her."
Courts define as foreseeable those injuries suffered by individ-
uals towards whom a defendant directs his negligent conduct, such
as the farmer in Versland; thus, such injuries are generally subject
only to proof that they are genuine.12 Recent judicial trends lean
toward also compensating a bystander who suffers foreseeable
emotional distress after seeing the death or serious injury of an-
other.13 The Montana Supreme Court, in Versland, required proof
that the bystander's emotional distress was foreseeable in addition
to proof that it was genuine."'
B. Standards To Ensure the Validity of Claims for Direct
Victims
While courts have traditionally subjected compensation for emo-
tional distress to stringent rules which limit the type of persons
compensated,"5 they have also allowed recovery for emotional dis-
tress upon proof of another cause of action."6 Plaintiffs suffering
7. E.g, Versiand, - Mont. at __, 671 P.2d at 585; Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d
72, 76-78, 451 N.E.2d 759, 764-65 (1983); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916,
922-23, 686 P.2d 813, 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 834 (1980).
8. Versland, - Mont. at - , 671 P.2d at 587; Paugh, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 78, 451
N.E.2d at 765; Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79
(1968).
9. Versland, - Vont, at -, 671 P.2d at 584.
10. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
11. Versland, - Mont. at - , 671 P.2d at 588.
12. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
13. See infra notes 45 to 56 and accompanying text.
14. Versland, - Mont. at - , 671 P.2d at 585.
15. See Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 933-34, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 470, 481-82 (1975).
16. Southern Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612, 615 (1916); Charlie Stuart Oldsmo-
bile, Inc. v. Smith, 171 Ind. App. 315, 325, 357 N.E.2d 247, 253 (1976); Smith v. Gowdy, 196
Ky. 281, 283-84, 244 S.W. 678, 679 (1922); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 47, comment
b, at 80-81 (1965).
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physical impact' 7 or physically manifesting the claimed emotional
distress have also recovered.'" Other courts have modified these
rules and allowed recovery to plaintiffs who were within the "zone
of danger" of the defendant's negligent conduct.'9
1. Parasitic Damages
Courts traditionally compensated "parasitic" emotional dis-
tress to plaintiffs who proved another "host" cause."° If a plaintiff
proved, for example, that the defendant tortiously invaded his
property, the courts permitted compensation for emotional distress
arising from the invasion." Courts employing this standard
avoided its harshness, however, by finding a host cause in even the
most trivial of circumstances." Exceptions eventually swallowed
the rule, and rendered it useless as a tool for assuring the validity
of claims. 3
2. Physical Impact Rule
The court in the 1888 English case of Victorian Railways
Commissioners v. Coultas24 first announced the rule that, absent
physical impact such as a train hitting the plaintiff's body, com-
pensation cannot be granted for emotional distress.2 5 Although the
British courts soon abandoned the rule, 6 courts in Massachusetts 7
and New York28 quickly adopted the holding and other jurisdic-
17. See, e.g., St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 405, 64 S.W. 226, 227 (1901);
Easton v. United Trade School Contracting Co., 173 Cal. 199, -, 159 P. 597, 599 (1916);
Mahoney v. Dankwart, 108 Iowa 321, 325-26, 79 N.W. 134, 135 (1899); Nelson v. Crawford,
122 Mich. 466, 471, 81 N.W. 335, 336 (1899); Miller v. Baltimore & O.S.W.R. Co., 78 Ohio
309, 322-23, 85 N.E. 499, 503-04 (1908).
18. See, e.g., Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 115, 593 P.2d 668, 669-70 (1979); Towns
v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 519, 579 P.2d 1163, 1165 (1978); Summers v. Western Idaho
Potato Processing Co., 94 Idaho 1, 2, 479 P.2d 292, 293 (1971); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Young, 384 So. 2d 69, 71 (Miss. 1980); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A
(4th ed. 1971). But see Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 170-71, 472 P.2d 509, 519-20
(1970).
19. Towns, 195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163; Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 210
A.2d 709 (1965); Shelton v. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1978).
20. See supra note 7 and cases cited.
21. E.g., Meyer v. 4-D Insulation, 60 Or. App. 70, 652 P.2d 852 (1982).
22. E.g., Rodrigues, 52 Hawaii at 170, 472 P.2d at 519 (quoting Fraser v. Blue Cross
Animal Hosp., 39 Hawaii 370, 373 (1952).
23. Rodrigues, 52 Hawaii at 170, 472 P.2d at 519.
24. 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C.) [1888].
25. Id.
26. Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669 [1901]; Bell v. Great N. Ry. Co., 26 L.R. Ir. 428
[1890].
27. Spade, 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88.
28. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
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tions throughout America followed.2 9
By allowing recovery even to plaintiffs suffering only the
slightest impact, courts subsequently reduced the rule to a mere
formality.30 The weakened rule, however, failed to distinguish valid
from invalid claims. Further, commentators and courts criticized
the underlying rationale of the rule, arguing that proof of emo-
tional distress was readily available. 1 Courts, therefore, required a
high threshold of proof for serious mental distress sufficient to
limit fraud."2
Commentators and courts also have disputed the "floodgates"
rationale underlying the physical impact rule. Professor Prosser
noted that the fear of a flood of litigation cannot alone justify judi-
cial refusal to grant compensation to victims of genuine emotional
distress.3" The courts which abandoned the physical impact re-
quirement encountered no resulting flood of ligation.3"
3. Physical Manifestation Rule
Most jurisdictions require that the plaintiff physically mani-
fest the claimed emotional distress.3 5 Although the rule does not
require contact with the plaintiff's body, it does call for objective
evidence of physical injury. Fear of fraudulent claims again justi-
fies the requirement: "The temporary emotion of fright, so far
from serious, is so evanescent a thing, so easily counterfeited, and
so trivial, that the courts have been quite unwilling to protect the
plaintiff against mere negligence."36 Exceptions to the rule arise in
the cases of negligent mishandling of corpses and negligent for-
warding of telegraph messages.3 7 Because the mishandling of a
29. See, e.g., supra note 17.
30. See, e.g., Porter v. Delaware, L & W.R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (impact
when dust fell in plaintiff's eye); Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930)
(impact when plaintiff inhaled smoke); Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga.
App. 599, 193 S.E. 458 (1937) (impact where coins harmlessly hit plaintiff's body).
31. See Comment, Refining the Traditional Theories of Recovery for Consumer
Mental Anguish, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REv. 81, 86-87. See also Towns, 195 Colo. at 519, 579 P.2d
at 1164; Fazone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 564, 214 A.2d 12, 14 (1965).
32. See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813,167 Cal. Rptr. 831; Rodrigues, 52 Hawaii
156, 472 P.2d 509; Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983); Paugh, 6 Ohio
St. 3d 72, 45 N.E.2d 75.
33. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv.
874, 877 (1939).
34. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Langley, 314 So. 2d 324, 339 (Miss. 1975); Falzone, 45
N.J. at 567, 214 A.2d at 16.
35. See supra note 18.
36. LAW oF TORTS, supra note 1, § 54, at 362.
37. See, e.g., Carey v. Lima, Salmon & Tully Mortuary, 168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d
181 (1959) (defendant negligently embalmed the body of plaintiff's father); Western Union
[Vol. 47
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corpse and the delivery of an incorrect telegraph message concern-
ing a loved one's health, in almost all circumstances, would give
rise to severe emotional distress, the courts find special likelihood
that such claims are genuine.3 8
C. The Bystander Victim and the Zone of Danger Rule
The most controversial cases involve bystander victims who
observe the injury or death of another person. Other courts allow
compensation if the plaintiff was "in close enough proximity to an
accident to have been placed in actual physical danger, and, that
as a result of being within the 'zone of danger' a plaintiff-by-
stander's emotional suffering was deemed genuine because of the
fear of that physical danger."39
Recovery is allowed under this rule even if no physical harm
results.'0 Although the courts initially employed the zone of danger
rule to mitigate the harshness of the physical impact rule,41 seem-
ingly deserving plaintiffs who were not within'the zone of danger
have been denied compensation under the more lienient rule.42 Re-
cently, the arbitrary results engendered by this rule and the other
traditional rules forced some jurisdictions, including Montana, to
adopt a more flexible rule of foreseeability. 43
III. MODERN TREND TOWARD REASONABLE FORESEEABILITY
A. The Reasonably Foreseeable Bystander
The California Supreme Court initiated the break from the
traditional tests of compensable emotional distress in the cele-
Tel. Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743 (1930) (defendant misinterpreted a message
with medical results concerning plaintiff's daughter); Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222
N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943) (defendant failed to deliver message of the death of plain-
tiff's brother).
38. See LAW OF TORTS, supra note 1, § 54, at 362.
39. Paugh, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 75, 451 N.E.2d at 763.
40. See Towns, 195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163; Robb, 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709; Shelton,
570 S.W.2d 861. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436, at 456-57 (1965).
41. See Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 403-04, 165 A. 182, 184 (1933) (defendant
negligently drove truck into plaintiff's house); Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 126 Vt. 405,
408, 234 A.2d 656, 658 (1967) (same).
42. Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952) (court denied recovery to
mother outside the zone of danger when witnessed children being run over); Whetham v.
Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972) (recovery denied to mother watching baby
being fatally dropped to the floor); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935)
(recovery denied to husband of mother who died after watching car run down child).
43. E.g., Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (overruling Amaya v.
Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963)); Ver-
sland, - Mont. -, 671 P.2d 583.
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brated case of Dillon v. Legg.4" In Dillon, a parent who witnessed
the death of her child recovered damages for the emotional trauma
which she suffered, even though she was outside the zone of dan-
ger. 5 The California court rejected as hopelessly artificial the rule
requiring a plaintiff-bystander to be in fear for his own personal
safety in order to recover.46
The court in Dillon rejected the assumption that imposing lia-
bility for emotional distress injuries leads to "successful assertion
of fraudulent claims. ' 47 Emotional distress, the court found, can be
proven.48 The mere possibility that some fraudulent claims might
prevail failed to "justify an abdication of the judicial responsibility
to award damages for sound claims . . .
The central issue in such a case is whether a defendant owed a
duty of care toward a plaintiff to refrain from causing the plaintiff
emotional distress.50 The Dillon court announced a test which ex-
amines whether the defendant could have "reasonably foresee[n]
the injury to plaintiff." 1 The test involves consideration of:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident
as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2)
Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon
plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the
accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from another
after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were
closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship
or the presence of only a distant relationship.2
The California court employed the foreseeability test when the
plaintiff is a bystander rather than the direct victim of a defend-
ant's actions; the court found that a direct victim's emotional dis-
tress is always foreseeable.5 3 In Dillon, however, the court still re-
quired physical manifestation of emotional distress. 4 Other
jurisdictions are split in their acceptance of the Dillon analysis.56
44. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72.
45. Id. at 731, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 735, 441 P.2d at 917, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
48. Id. at 743, 441 P.2d at 922, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
49. Id. at 737, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
50. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
53. Molien, 27 Cal.3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
54. Dillon, 68 Cal.2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
55. Courts rejecting bystander recovery include Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552
(Minn. 1980); Keck, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (en banc); Shelton, 570 S.W.2d 861;
Grimsby v. Sampson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp.,
[Vol. 47
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B. The Reasonably Foreseeable Direct Victim
In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals" the California Su-
preme Court similarly rejected the traditional tests for compensa-
ble emotional distress. In Molien, however, the plaintiff was the
direct victim 57 of the defendant's conduct.58 There, the plaintiff re-
covered for emotional distress which he suffered after the defend-
ant-hospital incorrectly diagnosed his wife as syphilitic, advised his
wife to tell him of the diagnosis and required him to submit to a
blood test.59 The court noted that compensation for emotional dis-
tress normally depends on (1) the finding of proof of physical in-
jury, (2) the assertion of an independent cause of action and (3)
the allegation of intentional, extreme and outrageous invasion of
mental tranquility.6 0
The court in Molien rejected traditional judicial line-drawing
and found unsatisfactory judicial allowance of compensation in
cases where all three factors are present and denial of compensa-
tion in all other circumstances.'e The court held that the para-
mount consideration is whether sufficient proof of serious mental
injury exists. e2 The court left this question to the trier of fact, and
suggested that expert medical testimony may objectively establish
the validity of a claim.6 3
IV. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN MONTANA
A. Historical Background
Montana has been at the forefront in allowing recovery for
emotional distress. In 1889 the United States Supreme Court, ap-
plying Montana law, in Kennon v. Gilmer," allowed recovery for
mental anguish which accompanied bodily injury. The court noted,
"[I]t is impossible to exclude the mental suffering in estimating
197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969).
Courts allowing bystander recovery include Versland, __ Mont. -, 671 P.2d 583;
Paugh, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759; Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300
(1979); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I.
643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
56. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831.
57. By "direct victim" the court refers to one to whom the defendant's negligent con-
duct is directed. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
60. Id. at 926-27, 616 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
61. Id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
62. Id. at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
63. Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
64. 131 U.S. 22 (1889).
1986]
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the extent of the personal injury for which compensation is to be
awarded."'6 5 In Cashin v. Northern Pacific Railway,66 the plaintiff
suffered severe shock when the defendant's blasting showered the
plaintiff's home with rocks.6 7 The court found physical injury in
the shock to the plaintiffs nervous system and allowed recovery of
damages.6 8 This opened the door to compensation for emotional
injuries absent a physical injury.
In Kelly v. Lowney & Williams,69 the court reaffirmed the
stance taken in Cashin, and stated, "[I]n this state there may be
recovery for damages for personal injuries occasioned by fright or
mental shock though there be no physical contact. '70 The category
of compensable emotional distress expanded to instances where
the plaintiff did not fear for his personal safety in French v. Ralph
Moore, Inc.71 In French, the defendant's negligently-installed gas
tanks contaminated the plaintiffs' home and restaurant.72 The
court stated, "There seems to be no sound reason to refuse to
award damages for discomfort and annoyance where the only in-
jury is to the real property since it is obvious that such an injury
may cause discomfort and annoyance without also causing an ac-
tual physical injury to the person. '73
In Dawson v. Hill & Hill Trucking,7 4 the court refused to com-
pensate sorrow, grief, and mental distress in a wrongful death ac-
tion. The court expressly overruled prior decisions which held that
only pecuniary loss could be recovered in such a case75 and attrib-
uted its reversal to social change and the development of tort
principles. 76
B. Bystander Victims: Versland v. Caron Transport
In Versland v. Caron Transport,77 the Montana Supreme
65. Id. at 26.
66. 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 862 (1934).
67. Id. at 99, 28 P.2d at 865.
68. Id. at 102, 28 P.2d at 866.
69. 113 Mont. 385, 126 P.2d 486 (1942).
70. Id. at 390, 126 P.2d at 488.
71. - Mont. - , 661 P.2d 844 (1983). See also Newton v. City of Roundup, 60
Mont. 24, 198 P.441 (1921); Nelson v. C & C. Plywood, 154 Mont. 414, 465 P.2d 314 (1970).
72. French, - Mont. at -, 661 P.2d at 846.
73. Id. at -, 661 P.2d at 848 (quoting Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal.
2d 265, -, 288 P.2d 507, 513 (1955).
74. __ Mont. -, 671 P.2d 589 (1983).
75. Id. at -, 671 P.2d at 594. See also Mize v. Rocky Mtn. Bell Telephone Co., 38
Mont. 521, 100 P. 971 (1909); Hollingsworth v. Davis-Daly Estates Copper Co., 38 Mont.
143, 99 P. 142 (1909) (Dawson overruled both cases which followed pecuniary loss rule).
76. Dawson, - Mont. at - , 671 P.2d at 592.
77. __ Mont. - , 671 P.2d 583.
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Court adopted the reasonable foreseeability test in allowing by-
stander recovery for emotional distress.7 8 The court in Versland
also rejected the assumption that the physical manifestation rule
was necessary to prevent fraudulent claims. It held that medical
science provides adequate means of determining whether a plain-
tiff has suffered "serious and compensable injury. 7 9
The court in Versland held compensable a bystander's emo-
tional distress when it determined that the defendant could have
foreseen the distress.80 The court modifed the Dillon criteria for
determining the foreseeability of a bystander's emotional distress:
1. The shock must result from a direct emotional impact upon the
plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous perception of the
accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others
after its occurrence. 2. The plaintiff and victim must be closely
related, as contrasted to an absence of any relationship or the
presence of only a distant relationship. 3. Either death or serious
physical injury of the victim must have occurred as a result of the
defendant's negligence.'
C. Direct Victims: Johnson v. Supersave Markets
In Johnson v. Supersave Markets,8 the Montana Supreme
Court extended its Versland decision and allowed direct victims of
negligent acts to recover damages for emotional distress without
showing physical injury. 3 In Johnson, city police arrested and
jailed the plaintiff whose wife had written a bad check to the de-
fendant supermarket.8 4 The Montana Supreme Court found the
supermarket negligent because it failed to inform the police that
the plaintiff had previously made complete restitution. It also af-
firmed the award of damages for the emotional distress of the
jailed plaintiff.88 The Johnson court did not discuss foreseeability,
presumably because the plaintiff was a direct victim. However, it
did emphasize its reluctance "to permit damages for specious emo-
tional upset." 86 To foreclose fraudulent claims, the court required
proof of a host cause of action for emotional distress and limited
78. Id. at -, 671 P.2d at 588.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. - Mont. -, 686 P.2d 209 (1984).
83. Id. at __, 686 P.2d at 212.
84. Id. at -, 686 P.2d at 210-11.
85. Id. at -, 686 P.2d at 211-12.
86. Id. at -' 686 P.2d at 212.
1986]
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damage awards to those cases where "tortious conduct results in
substantial invasion of a legally protected interest and causes sig-
nificant impact upon the person of plaintiff. 87 The invasion of the
plaintiff's interest in freedom, and by the plaintiff's emotional re-
sponse to being jailed, the court found, fulfilled this standard.88
V. ANALYSIS OF VERSLAND AND JOHNSON
A. Parasitic Damages for Emotional Distress in Direct Victim
Cases
The court in Johnson, seeking to assure the genuineness of
claims through its standard of substantial invasion of a legally pro-
tected interest, banished emotional distress to the category of par-
asitic damages. This holding contradicts Versland. The Versland
criteria determine the foreseeability of emotional distress suffered
by one to whom a defendant did not direct his negligent conduct.89
After fulfillment of the three-pronged foreseeability test, the Ver-
sland holding allows compensation upon proof that the emotional
distress is genuine.9 0 Although both the direct and bystander vic-
tims suffer foreseeable emotional distress, only direct victims
under Johnson must prove the invasion of a legally protected in-
terest, other than peace of mind, before receiving compensation. 1
In Molien, the California court rejected the requirement of an
independent cause of action as a prerequisite to an award for emo-
tional damages: "[A]lthough we recognize a need to guard against
fraudulent claims, we are not persuaded that the presently existing
artificial lines of demarcation are the only appropriate means of
attaining this goal."'92 The court adopted the proposition that
"freedom from negligent infliction of serious mental distress is en-
titled to independent legal protection," 93 and relied upon a heavy
standard of proof that the emotional distress is serious to assure
the validity of the claims.9 4
Rather than focusing on the seriousness of the emotional dis-
tress, the Montana Supreme Court added the most archaic of stan-
dards as an additional barrier to compensation. By requiring the
invasion of another legally protected interest, the court contra-
87. Id. at __, 686 P.2d at 213.
88. Id.
89. Versland, - Mont. at -, 671 P.2d at 587.
90. Id. at -, 671 P.2d at 588.
91. Johnson, - Mont. at -, 686 P.2d at 213.
92. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 927, 616 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
93. Id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
94. Id. at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
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dicted its Versland holding and denied independent legal protec-
tion to the right to freedom from infliction of emotional distress.
The standard is also problematic because it fails to define a
legally protected interest. The court derived this requirement from
the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Meyer v. 4-D Insulation."
In Meyer, the Oregon Court of Appeals found a substantial legal
interest only in "certain intentional torts, private nuisance, inva-
sions of privacy and other miscellaneous cases.""6 The invasion of
these interests, the court held, gives rise to compensable mental
distress.9 Unlike the court in Meyer, which required the invasion
of a significant interest,98 the Montana Supreme Court in Johnson
required the significant intrusion on any legally protected
interest.9
The plaintiff wife in Versland received compensation for emo-
tional distress upon the mere proof that her distress as a bystander
was foreseeable and genuine. Ironically, had her husband survived
to press a claim for emotional distress, the standards in Johnson
would have required him, as a direct victim, to offer more exten-
sive proof as a prerequisite to recovery.
B. The Significant Impact Standard in Direct Victim Cases
The second standard in Johnson, that the impact of the tor-
tious conduct must be significant, demonstrates the court's desire
to compensate only valid claims for mental distress. The court,
however, failed to define "significant impact."' 00 In Johnson, the
plaintiff's divorce attorney testified that while in jail, the plaintiff
"was much more agitated than what I had seen him before" and
that he "seemed disoriented . ..in a sense that he didn't under-
stand why he was there, what had happened that had led him
there."101 The attorney also testified that the plaintiff uncharacter-
istically repeated questions and exhibited "[a] lot more hand
movement, expressions, pacing, and nervousness . ". . .",0 From
this evidence the court, somehow, found "serious" impact.
The court in Versland indicted that it would rely on "today's
more advanced state of medical science, technology and testing
95. 60 Or. App. 70, 652 P.2d 852 (1982).
96. Id. at -, 652 P.2d at 854.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Johnson, __ Mont. at - , 686 P.2d at 213.
100. Id. at -, 686 P.2d at 214.
101. Id. at , 686 P.2d at 213.
102. Id. at __, 686 P.2d at 213-14.
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techniques" to assure the genuineness of claims for emotional dis-
tress.10 3 The testimony of the lay witnesses in Johnson, however,
sets a low threshold for proof of genuine emotional distress and
renders doubtful the court's alleged concern for compensating only
serious emotional distress.'0
4
C. Distinction Between Injury and Distress in Johnson
The court in Johnson distinguished physical and mental in-
jury from mere distress. Physical and mental injury, the court
held, is compensable in all cases. 0 5 Mental distress is compensable
only upon proof of the invasion of a legally protected interest caus-
ing significant impact on the plaintiff. '
This distinction appears to be drawn from the court's earlier
decision in Cashin.10 7 In that case, the court acknowledged the rule
denying compensation for mental pain and suffering absent physi-
cal injury, but found that the alleged shock itself constituted phys-
ical injury.
The court in Cashin found that the plaintiff met the require-
ment that physical injury accompany a claim for damages for
mental pain and suffering by alleging in his complaint, damages to
the nervous system:
It must be conceded that a nervous shock or paroxysm, or a dis-
turbance of the nervous system, is distinct from mental anguish
and falls within the physiological, rather than psychological,
branch of the human organism. It is a matter of general knowl-
edge that an attack of sudden fright, or an exposure to imminent
peril, has produced in individuals a complete change in their ner-
vous system. * * * Such a result must be regarded as an injury to
the body rather than to the mind, even though the mind be at the
same time injuriously affected."0 8
The California Supreme Court in Molien, analyzing identical lan-
guage, refused to recognize a distinction between physical and
mental injury 09 and allowed compensation for all serious emo-
tional distress proven to be genuine.110The distinction between injury and distress is problematic.
103. Versland, - Mont. at -, 671 P.2d at 588.
104. See Johnson, - Mont. at -, 686 P.2d at 213.
105. Id. at , 686 P.2d at 212.
106. Id. at -, 686 P.2d at 213.
107. 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 862 (1934).
108. Cashin, 96 Mont. at 102, 28 P.2d at 866 (quoting Sloane v. Southern Ry., 111 Cal.
668, -, 44 P. 320, 322 (1896)).
109. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
110. Id.
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The court in Johnson described emotional distress as "pass[ing]
under various names such as mental suffering, mental anguish,
nervous shock, and includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions,
such as fright, horror, grief, shame, embarrassment, anger, chagrin,
disappointment, and worry."' That description and the descrip-
tion of injury found in Cashin defy clear differentiation, especially
insofar as both include "nervous shock." A plaintiff alleging "ner-
vous shock" as injury could plead damages under the Cashin hold-
ing and avoid proving substantial invasion of a legally protected
interest as required in Johnson. The same plaintiff could allege
"nervous shock" as emotional distress under the Johnson holding
and employ the seemingly lax factual standard for significant im-
pact found in that case.
The court in Versland recognized no dichotomy and reduced
the determination to "whether plaintiff suffered a serious and com-
pensable injury. "112 It found physical manifestation to be merely
one element which a trier of fact could consider in finding that
emotional distress is genuine. " In the case of a direct victim,
proof of physical injury is one fact along with other evidence which
the trier of fact could consider in determining whether there has
been significant impact upon the plaintiff.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
In Versland, the Montana Supreme Court continued its pro-
gressive policy of compensating emotional distress damages by fol-
lowing the lead of jurisdictions allowing recovery for bystander vic-
tims. The Versland standards determine whether a bystander
plaintiff shares with the direct victim one of the basic elements for
recovery in tort: foreseeable injury. Once a bystander plaintiff
demonstrated that his injuries were foreseeable, the only barrier to
his recovery was the requirement that he prove the genuineness of
his injuries.
The Johnson decision represents a step backward in the anal-
ysis of compensable emotional distress. For no apparent or logical
reason, the Johnson court requires a different test of genuineness
for the direct victim than it does for the bystander victim. The
bystander victim need only prove the genuineness of the injury,
but the direct victim must also prove the invasion of another le-
gally protected interest.
111. Johnson, - Mont. at -, 686 P.2d at 212 (quoting Roberts v. Saylor, 230
Kan. 289, 637 P.2d 1175 (1981)).
112. Versland, - Mont. at _, 671 P.2d at 588.
113. Id.
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The requirement of a host cause of action as a condition for
recovering emotional distress damages fails to assure the validity
of claims. Courts have found a host cause of action in almost any
situation. 1' The requirement will merely encourage extravagent
pleading, an evil which the court in Versland cited when it re-
jected physical injury as a condition for recovery. '15
The Johnson decision is also at odds with itself in requiring
proof of a significant impact, while allowing compensation for dis-
tress which bordered on the trivial. The distinction which the
court found between emotional injury and emotional distress also
promises to encourage extravagant pleading and to confuse the
facts to be plead and proven in a case involving mental distress.
Johnson purports to ensure that only valid claims for emo-
tional distress are compensated. A unified approach to compensat-
ing foreseeable direct and bystander victims, requiring a higher
standard of proof of genuineness of distress, would better meet this
goal. After fulfilling the Versland test, the foreseeable bystander
victim should be subject to the same test of genuineness as that
applied to the direct victim. Other jurisdictions follow the stan-
dard announced in Versland, that the injury be serious, in allowing
compensation for emotional distress of both direct and bystander
victims. 16
The court in Molien relied exclusively on proof that the
mental distress was serious '117 and held that objective proof of emo-
tional distress can adequately preclude fraudulent claims.1 1 8 In
Rodrigues v. State,'19 the Supreme Court of Hawaii also required
proof of serious emotional distress and found it "where a reasona-
ble man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope
with the emotional distress engendered by the circumstances of the
case."'' s The Ohio Supreme Court, employing Rodrigues, allows
compensation only in cases such as psychosis or neurosis. 2 ' This
more stringent standard ensures that emotional damages, whether
they be termed injury or distress, are genuine.
In following these decisions, the Montana Supreme Court need
114. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
115. Versland, __ Mont. at -, 671 P.2d at 587 (quoting Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at
__, 616 P.2d at 280, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838).
116. See, e.g., Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 136, 447 N.E.2d 109,
113 (1983) (direct victim recovered for serious emotional distress); Paugh, 6 Ohio St. 3d at
78, 451 N.E.2d at 765 (bystander recovered for serious emotional distress).
117. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
118. Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
119. Rodrigues, 52 Hawaii at 172, 472 P.2d at 519.
120. Id. at 173, 472 P.2d at 520.
121. Paugh, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 78, 451 N.E.2d 759, 765.
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only extend its holding from Versland and find unnecessary tradi-
tional limitations on recovery for emotional distress "in light of to-
day's more advanced state of medical science, technology and test-
".122ing . ..
122. Versland, - Mont. at -, 671 P.2d at 588.
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